The theoretical analysis focuses on the distinction between temporary and permanent movements in government purchases. Under plausible conditions, the temporary case involves an output response that is positive, less than one-to-one with the change in government purchases, and larger than that generated by an equal-sized, but permanent, shift in purchases. The equilibrium real rate of return rises in the temporary case, but changes little in the permanent one. Defense purchases are divided empirically into "permanent" and "temporary" components by considering the role of (temporary) wars. No temporary shifts in nondefense purchases were isolated. Empirical results verify an expansionary output effect for temporary purchases that exceeds that of permanent purchases. The results for some other expectational hypotheses are found to be generally supportive of the theory.
The Government's Budget
The government's real demand for commodities during period t is denoted by Gt. Let Tt represent the real value of date t's tax collections, net of any transfer payments. Taxes and transfers are treated initially as lump sum in nature, but this assumption is relaxed later. Inflationary finance can be viewed as a particular form of (non-lumpsum) tax, which need not be introduced separately for present purposes. The model does not deal with monetary variables or the determination of the absolute price level and the nominal interest rate. These matters do not seem central for a study of the real effects of government purchases.
Abstracting initially from interest-bearing public debt, the governimient's budget constraint requires an equality each period between purchases and the net amount of real taxes: Gt= Tt.
(1)
The possibility of government borrowing relaxes this condition of budget balance each period, but does not alter the principal findings that are discussed below.
In calculating its permanent income, the representative household figures in the anticipated present value of its share of taxes-net-oftransfers. For aggregate purposes, the important magnitude at some starting date 0 is the expectation of the present value, t1=I [TIl(1 + r)t]. From equation (1), this magnitude coincides with the expected present value of government purchases, it., [Gt/(l + r)t].l It is convenient to work with the uniform flow of purchases, G, that would yield the same present value of purchases as the time path, Gt. This flow, which is referred to as "permanent purchases," is determined from the condition G -r A [Gt/(1 + r)t].
(2) t= 1
Holding fixed any service value that the private sector attaches to the time path of Gr-which is discussed next-a rise in G impacts on households exactly as would a corresponding decrease in permanent income. In particular, an increase in permanent purchases, G, tends to reduce Cd and raise the supply of labor services at all dates. (The positive response of work effort depends on the lump-sum nature of taxes. See the subsequent discussion.) The increase in work offers translates-through the equilibration of the labor market or via the direct behavior of household/producers in the present framework-into increased commodity supply, yS For a given value of r, a rise in G requires a one-to-one decline in the representative household/producer's "average" planned value over time for Cd net of Ys. This result follows from the intertemporal budget constraint for a household/producer, where the time path of Cd and net real taxes appear on the expenditure side, and the time path of Ys appears on the income side. If the current value of Cd net of Ys falls by less than one-to-one with G, then the typical household must be planning to reduce some future net values by greater than one-to-one. That is, the household responds in this case to the drop in effective permanent income by shifting relative expenditures (on consumption and leisure) from the future to the present. Similarly, a decline in current values by more than one-to-one with G would signify an intention to shift expenditures from the present to the future. Since a pure income effect is involved, it seems reasonable to 2 With public debt included, the expected present value of net real taxes equals the expected present value of real purchases plus the initial amount of real government debt. In particular, there is still a one-to-one relation between changes in the anticipated present values of real purchases and net real taxes. This calculation assumes that the government's real interest rate equals r. The possibility of chain-letter, perpetual deficit finance has also been excluded. See Barro (1978) for a discussion of these and related matters, including the role of finite lifetimes.
concentrate on the intermediate case where the intertemporal pattern of expenditures is unchanged. In this case, at a given value of r, the decline in current Cd net of the increase in Ys exactly matches the rise in G.3
The Role of Public Services
The government is viewed as utilizing its commodity purchases at each date, Gt, to provide a contemporaneous flow of public services to the private sector. These services are treated as provided free of charge to household/producers. Two types of services are considered. One form is modeled as a direct conveyer of utility to households. Examples which do not encompass the traditional roles of government include parks, libraries, school lunch programs, (subsidized) hospitals, and, possibly, highway and transportation programs. (The latter category could be viewed alternatively as an input to private production functions.) An important feature of these forms of public services is the possibility of close substitution with private consumer spending.
The second type of service is an input to private production processes, which can apply either to businesses or households. Examples include the provision of a legal system, aspects of national defense, fire and police services, education, and various regulatory activities. (The last item is likely to exhibit negative marginal product.) In some cases these services would be close substitutes for private inputs of labor and capital. However, in areas like the provision of a legal system and national defense, the public services are likely to enhance the marginal products of private factors.
In many situations a particular government activity would exhibit features of both general types of public services that are being considered. The extent to which each feature was represented would vary across a wide range of programs. Despite this real world diversity, the formal analysis proceeds as if there were a single type of governmental activity, which has service attributes that are partly of the direct-utility type and partly of the productive-input type.
Government-provided services are often modeled as "public," as opposed to private, goods in the sense of being "nonrival"-one person's enjoyment of the good does not diminish the enjoyment by another person.4 It is doubtful that this characteristic applies to the 'This result does not depend on an infinite horizon for the representative household. Finite lives can alter the effects of some government actions, such as changes in public debt or social security, that involve a publicly mandated shift in incomes across generations. Government purchases that are financed contemporaneously by taxes (which are independent of age) do not involve these considerations.
4This characteristic is embedded in the theoretical analysis of Samuelson (1954). majority of' government purchases at the current time. Falling outside of' this category would be the bulk of expenditures on education, hospitals, school lunch programs, and any service that is subject to congestion, such as parks, courts, libraries, transportation and highway projects, and police/fire services. Even in the case of national defense, the benefits to individuals are likely to be relative to the total amount of property that is being defended, because the level of external threat would respond to the potential prize from conquest (see Thompson 1974) . In a nonrivalry situation, individual utility or production would depend on the total of' government services rather than on the quantity provided to the particular economic unit. Because nonrivalry seems atypical, the modeling assumes that individual utility and production depend on real government purchases per capita. However, the general form of the analysis would not be altered appreciably if soine elements of nonrivalry were introduced.
Consider, first, the direct interplay in utility functions between government services and household choices of consumption and leisure. Suppose, as stressed by Bailey (1971, chap. 9) , that the contemporaneous levels of (per capita) Gt and (individual) Ct are close substitutes in utility terms. For example, assume that each unit of Gt (per capita) is viewed as providing utility services that are equivalent to a fraction 0 of a unit of' contemporaneous individual consumption expenditure .5 That is, household utility depends on the effective consumption flow at each date, C* Ct + OGt, where 0 -0 -1. The formulations neglects this type of utility substitution among noncontemporaneous values for C and G or between G and leisure. The provision of' these types of public services means that households obtain units of effective consumption, C*, that exceed the quantity of private real expenditures, C. The permanent flow of government purchases, G, can be used to finance the uniform effective consumption flow, OG.7 This aspect of public services offsets the negative permanent income effect from G that was described earlier (see also n. 6 above). The permanent income effect that is pertinent to private choices on consumption expenditure and leisure is now (0 -1)Gthe condition 0 -0 -1 implies that the permanent income effect of G is still less than or equal to zero, but no larger than one in magnitude. 5Ihe parameter 0 can be viewed in the following analysis as applying to the marginal Unit of G,. 6 The time path of Gt could also affect overall household utility in a forill that was adl(litively separable from the time paths of effective consumption and leisure. In this sense the 0 parameter need not limit the utility value that households attach to public services. This possibility does not invalidate the subsequent discussion of' permanent income changes that are induced by shifts in G.
7the discussion assumes that the inequality constraint, C, t 0, is never binding.
With G held fixed, an increase in Gt now implies some direct crowding out of contemporaneous private commodity demand. In order to maintain the level of effective consumption, C*-which is appropriate when G, the other determinants of permanent income, and r are held fixed-Ctd must decline with Gt in accordance with the parameter 0. The greater the utility substitution (at the margin) between Ct and Gt-as measured here by 0-the larger the negative response of Ctd to an increase in Gt. As long as 0 1 applies, aggregate commodity demand for date t -ytd Ctd + Gt-rises as the nonnegative fraction, (1 -0), of increases in Gt (when G is held fixed).
Consider next the role of public services as an input to private production processes. It is assumed that public services of this type have a positive marginal product, which is denoted by MPG. The condition MPG -1, which is assumed to hold, implies that the marginal response of (aggregate) private output to an increase in (aggregate) G does not exceed the social cost of providing the extra public services input. Through its role as a productive input, an increment in G raises commodity supply, Ys, for given levels of private factor inputs. Note that part of total output will be utilized to provide intermediate goods, which take the form of publicly supplied production inputs. Although there are good reasons in principle for deleting these intermediate goods from measures of final product, this approach is not followed in the national accounts.8 In the theoretical analysis the output measure, Y, is also gross of this type of intermediate production.
Because the public-service inputs are provided freely, a change in G alters private sector real incomes in accordance with the marginal product, MPG. The representative household receives a per capita share of this extra real income. This effect further offsets the inverse influence of G on permanent income. The net effect now depends on the term (0 + MPG -1), which is nonpositive but no greater than one in magnitude if 0 -0 + MPG -1 applies.9
If variations in G alter the marginal products of private productive inputs, then additional effects would arise through changes in factor demand functions. Cases where public services substitute for private inputs-such as the provision of public rather than private 8These matters are discussed in Kuznets (1948, pp. 156-57) and Musgrave (1959, pp. 186-88). The double-counting property for publicly provided production inputs implies that empirical counterparts of total output, like real GNP, overstate the response of final output to government purchases.
9 Recall that the analysis deals with a composite government service that has attributes of the direct-utility (0) and production-input (MPG) type. A particular category of purchases is unlikely to exhibit a high value for both parameters, 0 and MPG. Therefore, if 0 < 1 and MPG > 1 apply for each category of purchases, the condition 0 + MPG 1 is likely to hold for the composite over all categories.
guards-would generate reductions in the marginal product of labor. On this count, the private demand for labor would tend to fall when G rises. In some other cases the private demand for capital services would decline. However, to the extent that background services like national defense and a legal system are expanded, factor marginal products are likely to rise, which would generate the opposite responses in private factor demands. The main analysis neglects the array of possible effects of government purchases on private factor marginal products.
Commodity-Market Clearing
The equilibrium condition for the commodity market is given by yd =Cd(. ,r, G, G) + G = Ys(. . .,r, G. G). 
Effects of a Temporary Rise in Government Purchases
Consider a temporary expansion of real government purchases, where G rises while G is held fixed. The budget condition from equation (1) implies that these purchases are financed by a contemporaneous increase in real taxes-net-of-transfers, T. In fact, for the context of a temporary rise in government spending-which is most pronounced at the federal level during wartime-it is more natural that the bulk of contemporaneous finance would take the form of interest-bearing debt issue rather than tax increases. This behavior allows the government to spread the higher taxes necessitated by temporary spending over a large time interval instead of implementing exceptionally high tax collections for a few periods (see Barro [1979 Barro [ , 1980b for discussions). With G held fixed, it would be possible to utilize interest-bearing debt so as to maintain the entire initial time path of' net real tax collections, Tt. In any event, for the setting of lump-sum taxes, the present value of' tax obligations is not altered by shifts between public debt and taxes (see n. 2 above). Since households' calculations of permanent incomes depend only on this present-value magnitude, the effects of increases in government purchases that are financed by debt issue would coincide with the effects of those that are financed by higher taxes.
The rise in G reduces Cd on the left side of equation (3) (3). Overall, the shift in "excess demand," Yet -Y-, is determined by the term (1 -0 -MPG). It was already assumed that this term is nonnegative-that is, the direct, one-to-one effect of G on aggregate demand is offset only partially by the utility-substitution and productive-input aspects of government purchases.
Since an increase in G raises excess commodity demand, a rise in the real rate of' return is required in order to restore commodity-market clearing. 10 This response in r reduces Cd and raises Ys. The rise in Ys reflects the substitution of' current work effort for planned future effort. Since Ys was also increased directly by the rise in G, it is apparent that equilibrium output rises. This output effect is greater the smaller is the value of 0, the larger is the value of MPG, and the greater is the real interest rate elasticity of Ys relative to that of Cd. In the polar case where 0 = 1 and MPG = 0, the response of Y and r to G would be nil. In this circumstance, government purchases would amount to lump-sum transfers to households, because Gt and Ct were perfect substitutes in the utility function.
Private consumer spending, Cd, is crowded out from the rise in r and from the initial negative effect of G. Therefore, the positive response of Y to G must be less than one-to-one-that is, the model exhibits an output dampener rather than a multiplier.
The positive response of output to temporary movements in government purchases would apply especially to wartime periods.1" The higher real rate of return can be viewed as a price signal that induces the intertemporal substitution of resources toward periods such as wars in which aggregate output is valued unusually highly. This type '0 Because the expansion of G is temporary, the rise in the equilibrium real rate of interest would also be temporary. An extension to allow divergences between current and expected future real rates of return does not alter the basic analysis.
Wartime may also be associated with uncertainties on maintaining property rights, which would tend to reduce private investment demand. The possibly changing probability of winning or losing a conflict would enter in this context. The analysis abstracts from these effects and from controls on prices or interest rates. Also excluded are effects of patriotism or coercive behavior, such as conscription. When r is unchanged, it follows from equation (3) that consumption falls, and total output rises. The expansion of production reflects partly the direct effect of G on Ys (which was assumed to be positive) and the negative income effect of G on leisure. (The net response of leisure becomes ambiguous when income taxation is introduced-see the subsequent analysis.) The decline in consumption means that output rises by less than one-to-one with the permanent expansion of government purchases; that is, an output dampener is again predicted.
Non-Lump-Sum Taxation
Some of the results are affected by the unrealistic assumption that government expenditures are financed by lump-sum taxation. This section explores the consequences of income taxes in a simple environment. Because the present analysis is concerned only with tax effects that are systematically related to changes in government purchases-rather than with public finance questions, per se-this simplified analysis may be adequate.
Suppose that government expenditures are financed by a general income tax. Let Tt represent the effective tax rate on incomes that accrue during period t.13 In a nonproportional tax setup, Tt would represent the average marginal income tax rate. Assume now that the government can borrow and lend at the real rate of interest, r-the same rate that applies to the private sector. Given the permanent flow of real government spending, which includes G and the comparable measure for real transfers,14 and the possibility for variations in public debt, there exists some income tax rate T-that is constant over time and also just satisfies the government's intertemporal budget constraint. 15 Although many patterns of time-varying tax rates would also satisfy the government's budgetary requirements, it will be desirable in most circumstances 16in terms of minimizing the distortions that are imposed on the private economy-to stabilize income tax rates over time. That is, the government would adjust its public debt issues and redemnptions in order to prevent divergences between current and expected future income tax rates. (For discussions of this type of result, see Barro [1979 Barro [ , 1980c ; Kydland and Prescott [1980, pp. 185-86].) In this setting changes in government purchases would not generate imiovements in current tax rates relative to expected future rates. This conclusion means that, first, variations in G with G held fixed have no effect on tax rates; second, shifts in G imply equal changes in current and expected future tax rates, T;7 and third, for the purpose of studying government purchases, it is unnecessary to deal with the intertemporal substitution effects that would arise from expected time variations in income tax rates.18
Given this framework for tax rate determination, it is unnecessary to modify the main conclusions that were derived earlier for the case 13 Ihe analysis neglects the double taxation of incomes that flow through the corporate sector. Taxation in the form of inflationary finance could be included separately without affecting the main results.
14 Real interest paymlients on an initial public debt stock would also enter. ' Because changes in tax rates affect the tax base, Y, the solution for T is generally nol-nunique. However, the minimal possible value for T is the pertinent choice.
16 It may be optimal to allow tax rates to vary over the business cycle. A countercyclical pattern shows up empirically for the U.S. federal government. However, the pattern is at least less pronounced in terms of' the total government sector. 17 It is assumed that increases in tax rates induce increases in real tax revenues within the relevant range.
18 E.g., these types of' effects are central to a study of' the investment tax credit (see Kvdland and Prescott 1977, pp. 482-86). of a temporary increase in government purchases. Notably, output and the real rate of interest continue to rise when G increases, with G held fixed. The principal modification to the previous findings is that r should be interpreted as the after-tax real rate of return, as calculated with the appropriate average marginal tax rate on interest in- come. 19 For the case of a permanent increase in government purchases, the new element is the rise in the income tax rate, T, along with the rise in G (see n. 17 above). The higher income tax rate motivates a shift away from market work and toward leisure and other nonmarket activities. In equation (3) this change is reflected as downward shifts in the Ys and Cd functions.20 For given values of r (now interpreted net of tax), G, G, and so on, it is plausible that the declines in Cd and Ys would roughly balance. In other words, as in some cases that were discussed earlier, there is no reason to expect a particular direction of change for the relative amounts of consumption and leisure expenditures that are conducted at different dates.
Given this pattern of response to a higher income tax rate, it still follows that a permanent shift in government purchases has no effect on the (after-tax) real rate of return. However, the negative effect of higher income taxation on the incentive to work offsets the tendency for output to rise.21 The net movement in output now involves three forces: first, the substitution away from work because of higher income tax rates; second, the negative income effect (associated with the higher level of G) on leisure, which motivates more work; and third, the direct productive-input effect of G on Ys. The first two influences involve the standard ambiguous net response of leisure to the substitution and income effects that are generated by either a change in the real wage rate or a shift in the income tax rate that is applicable to labor income. However, the income effect here involves the term -(1 -0 -MPG)G, while the tax shift applies one-to-one to G. This difference increases the likelihood that the substitution effect will outweigh the income effect. Suppose that the substitution effect were, in fact, comparable to or dominant over the income effect. In this case the overall change in output that is induced by a permanent rise inl 19This result assumes that interest income is taxable and interest payments are deductible from taxable income. The conclusion neglects systematic differences between the marginal tax rates applicable to receivers of' interest income vs. those pertinent for payers. The result is not affected directly by the taxation of' nominal, rather than real, interest payments. However, other effects of inflation on effective tax rates would matter. 20 The incentive to accumulate capital would also be diminished. Through this channel, a permanent increase in government purchases tends to reduce the capital stock, even when the after-tax rate of return is unchanged. 21 A reduction in the capital stock, as mentioned in n. 20, reinforces this effect. government purchases would be bounded from above by the direct positive effect of G on YU. This channel corresponds to only one portion of' the positive output response that arose for the case of' a temporary increase in government purchases-the other part involves the intertemporal substitution effect on work effort, which is associated with the increase in r. It follows that temporary rises in government purchases would induce larger output responses than equal size, but permanent, rises in purchases. The sign of the output response is now ambiguous for the case of a permanent expansion of government purchases-the reaction is more likely to be positive when the marginal product of public services is high.
Overall, temporary expansions of' government purchases are distinguished from permanent increases in that, first, the positive effect on output of the temporary expansion is likely to be larger and, second, a positive effect on the (after-tax) real rate of' interest is predicted only for the temporary case. The present empirical investigation deals only with output effects of temporary versus permanent movements in government purchases. Some preliminary analysis of real-rate-of-return effects is carried out in Barro (1981a).
II. Empirical Implementation
The theoretical propositions will be tested by examining the effects of government purchases in a reduced-form relationship for output, as measured by real GNP. The analysis is an extension of previous empirical research (Barro 1981b ), which stressed the business cycle influences of monetary disturbances. This earlier work included a government purchases variable, but did not distinguish temporary from permanent government spending.
It is convenient to carry out the analysis in terms of the ratio of real government purchases to real GNP, GIY. In particular, temporary or permanent variations in G are assumed to enter relative to Y in a linear relation for the log of output-that is, 
Some hypotheses arise that concern the role of the Zt variables in equations (4), (6), and (7). If these variables can be guaranteed, ex ante, not to appear separately in the list of omitted elements that are denoted by . in equation (4), then the Zt variables would appear in equation (7) only to the extent that they serve as determinants for (GIY)t in the F-function of equation (6). Some cross-equation restrictions therefore emerge for the parameters of equations (6) and (7).
The next sections deal with the problem of modeling a form of equation (6) for real government purchases in the United States.22 22 Levis Kochin has suggested the attractive alternative of' using the current overall tax rate as a proxy for the anticipated, long-run average ratio of government purchases to GNP. The rationale for identifying the current tax rate with the anticipated government expenditure ratio was discussed in the theoretical section. Some problems with implementing Kochin's suggestion are: First, the distinction between purchases and expenditures implies that a separate model would be required to predict future transfers (including interest payments), which is not obviously easier than modeling pur-
Government Purchases Equation
The stress on transitory movements in government purchases suggests special attention to war-related expenditures, which are likely to be viewed as largely temporary. I have proceeded empirically by separating total government (federal plus state and local) real purchases of goods and services into a "defense" component, GW, and other purchases, GP. The present analysis does not attempt to classify components of government purchases in accordance either with their relative substitutabilities with private spending, as reflected above in the 0 parameter, or with their role as inputs to private production, as measured above by the MPG parameter. Differences between defense and nondefense items with respect to these parameters affect the interpretation of some of the empirical findings. Presumably, defense purchases are characterized by a relatively low value of 0 and possibly by a relatively high value of MPG. The former implies a relatively large output effect of temporary defense purchases, while the latter would enhance the output effects of both temporary and permanent defense purchases. The empirical analysis would be sharpened by obtaining a division of nondefense purchases into relatively homogeneous categories with respect to the 0 and MPG parameters, but the feasibility of this classification is unclear. Transfer payments have not been included in the analysis.
Defense Purchases
A primary determinant of Gw would be the level of current and anticipated future wartime activity, assuming that at least the timing of wars can be treated as exogenous with respect to expenditure decisions. I have quantified this influence by using a casualty rate measure Bt, which represents battle deaths per 1,000 total population (see table 1) for the wartime years since the Civil War: 1898, 1917-18, 1941-45, 1950-53, 1964-72. In effect, this variable can be viewed as an alternative to a set of wartime dummy variables. The casualty rate measure represents an attempt homogeneously to quantify the intensities of different wars and different years within each war, without using military expenditures or personnel measures, which are the types of variables that are to be explained. In particular, the use of chases directly; and, second, the use of the tax rate to proxy the permanent expenditure ratio may work better for the federal government than for total government. See Benjamin and Kochin (1978) , who argue that mobility possibilities would prevent state and local governments from choosing an excess-burden-minimizing debt policy. However, this issue involves also the federal government's interaction with state and local governments-that is, the federal government may compensate for public debt/tax variations that cannot be carried out at the state and local levels. 
where D is the first-difference operator and Et Ut -Ut-1 is a whitenoise error term. A constant is insignificant when added to equation (10) in the empirical analysis-that is, there is no trend in the defense purchases ratio. Moving-average error terms or more complicated autoregressive error structures also did not add to the explanatory value of the equation.
The form of equation (10) implies that a current shock Et-which is not associated with wartime in the sense that the values of the DB variables are small-would have a permanent effect on the future mean level of gW. Because of the inclusion of the kw1 term with a negative sign in equation (10), the effect on gw of Et-that is, of the current actual value gtw with values of the B variables and kw, held fixed-turns out to be positive, but somewhat less than one-to-one. On the other hand, if the distribution for future values of B is stationary in level form, positive values for DB tend to be followed at later dates by negative values, which lead to decreases in future values of gw. In other words wars and the accompanying levels of expenditures are modeled as temporary. This mechanism implies that an increase in gw' that is accompanied by positive values of DB will have much less effect on gt than will the equivalent peacetime change in defense spending. Wartime spending has an appreciable effect on gt only to the extent that military expenditures depart from the amount associated typically with the current level of war intensity. The possibility that wars have a systematically important permanent effect on the purchases ratio is ruled out by the form of equation (10). Some alternative specifications of the error process that would have admitted this type of persisting effect were not supported empirically for the United States.
As detailed in the Appendix, equations (10) and (8) can be used to express expected future values of the defense purchases ratio, gw j, as a function of the latest observed ratio gtw, the value kwL1, and actual and expected future values of the war intensity variable, B. Summation over these expressions with proper allowance for discounting yields a relation for the permanent purchases ratio gt in terms of gtw, kw 1, the array of B variables, and a real discount rate p (which equals the difference between the real interest rate and the growth rate of real GNP). The main product of this exercise from the full empirical analysis is the series for temporary real defense purchases expressed relative to It should not be surprising that the (gW -gw)t variable exhibits a substantial amount of positive serial correlation. In this respect a gap between current and normal values-which the (gW -gW)t variable is intended to capture-should be distinguished from thg spread between actual and anticipated or perceived amounts, which has been stressed in earlier analyses of monetary disturbances (Barro 1981b ). The latter type of variable exhibits serial independence as a consequence of rational expectations and the assumption that information is received with, at most, a one-period lag. This type of argument does not apply to a variable that measures temporary effects. In the case of the temporary defense purchases variable, the large number of (serially correlated) peacetime years with small negative values of (gWgW)t is offset by a smaller number of (serially correlated) wartime years with excesses of gtw over gw. ( 
GY, where Y is real GNP (1972 base). Gu is real defense purchases (1972 base). Data since 1929 are from National Income and Product Accounts of the United States and recent issues of the United States Survey of Current Business. the fraction of' nominal defense purchases its total notninal federal purchases was multiplied by figures on real federal purchases (1972 base

Empirical Results
The principal empirical analysis involves joint estimation of the government purchases equation (10) (10) and (11) 
This relation is a particular form of equation (6). Equation (14) shows a positive but less than one-to-one effect on gw of gg', a positive effect of ktII1 (for a given value of gg, ), and a basically negative effect of the casualty rate variables (again given the value of gtU). Values of gt that are calculated from equation (14) are shown along with values of gl' in table 2. The temporary defense purchases variable, (g"' -gl')t, has a significantly expansionary effect on output. The estimated coefficient26 in equation (13) is ,3 = .99, S.E. = .21. The "t-value" corresponding to ,/3 = 0 is 4.7. The normal defense purchases variable, g', is also significantly expansionary in this equation-fl2 = .55, S.E. = .12, which implies a t-value of 4.6. The estimated effect for the permanent purchases variable is somewhat greater than half that of the estimated temporary effect.27 The results permit rejection of two extreme hypotheses: first, that only the temporary part of purchases affects output (which would require /82, the estimated coefficient of the <g variable in eq. [ 13], to differ insignificantly from zero), 26 Because of the negative correlation of (g"' -gX)t with gt, the /,3 coefficient picks up an additional effect. The extra term involves the difference between the output effects of' permanent and temporary nondefense purchases. The output coefficient associated with temporary nondefense purchases could not be estimated with the available data. However, since the regression coefficient of gt on (gU -7)t is on the order of -0. 1, it is unlikely that the overall modification is important. 27 It has been suggested that the temporary government purchases variable may be proxying for the effects of accompanying federal deficits. The analysis in Barro (1979) documents the strong positive effect of temporary federal spending, as in wartime, on public-debt issue. Some preliminary results in Barro (1980b) indicate that lagged "debt shocks" have expansionary effects on output that are statistically significant but substantially weaker than those of monetary shocks. However, this constructed debt-shock variable filters out the normal positive association between temporary government spending and the deficit. With these debt shocks held fixed, the actual lagged values of public-debt growth have no explanatory value for output. This last finding suggests that the strong expansionary influence of' temporary defense purchases does not involve a proxying for the effect of correlated movements in the federal deficit. and second, that temporary and permanent purchases are of equal importance for output. The latter case would correspond to equal coefficients (,31 = /32) for the (g4' -g)t and gtw' variables-that is, to the proposition that the coefficient of the Tt variable would be zero in an equation that held fixed the value of the actual purchases ratio, gt'. For convenience, the results from equation (13) The hypothesis that the coefficient of the gt' variable equals zero corresponds to a t-value of 1.8, which is significant at the 5 percent level for the case of this one-sided test. That is, the null hypothesis of equal output effects for temporary and permanent defense purchases (I13 = /32 in eq.
[11]) is rejected in favor of the hypothesis that temporary purchases are more expansionary, I3l > /32. The estimated coefficient on the (gu4 -gW')t variable in equation (13) implies that a temporary change in the level of real defense purchases has almost a one-to-one effect on the contemporaneous level of output. While this finding is consistent with the restriction, 131 S 1, the evidence would also be consistent with a moderate multiplier relationship between temporary government purchases and output. The relatively high estimated output effect is associated in the theoretical model with a small value of the 0-coefficient, a high value of the MPG parameter, and a high real-rate-of-return elasticity of aggregate supply relative to that of demand.
The estimated coefficient on the 9t variable in equation (13) implies that a permanent increase by one unit in real defense purchases leads approximately to a one-half unit rise in real GNP. This result accords with the restriction /32 : 1-moreover, the estimate is significantly below unity in this case.
The estimated coefficient of gt, the nondefense purchases ratio, is 28 I considered discriminating between temporary and permanent defense purchases by utilizing a measure of the return on the equities of defense contractors relative to that on a market portfolio of' New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) stocks. (The relativereturns variable was constructed using data on total returns to NYSE stocks from the Center for Research in Security Prices of the University of Chicago. A list of' defense contractors and the size of these contracts for 1969 from the Department of' Defense was kindly supplied to me by Claire Friedland.) This relative-returns variable has no explanatory power when added to a first-difference form of the output equation with Dgu, DgO, and the determinants of Dgw from the form of eq. (12) included as independent variables. Conceptually, it is unclear whether the relative-returns variable signifies an increase in war probability and, therefore, that current defense expenditures are more likely to be temporary, or an increase in the long-run expected quantity of' defense purchases, which would imply that current defense expenditures are more likely to be permanent. Therefore, the sign of the variable is ambiguous on theoretical grounds. There would, of course, be many possible output effects of war that do not operate through the channels that were specified in the present model. For example, there would be responses to conscription and patriotism, and the possibility that war would threaten future property rights. Some of these effects would, however, influence output in a manner similar to that of the pecuniary intertemporal substitution variable that was stressed in the theoretical analysis (see Barro [1981a] for a discussion of wartime influences on financial rates of return). In particular, the level of temporarily high demands on resources by the government, (gl' -g11')t, may proxy satisfactorily for the full range of wartime output effects.
More generally, because the war variables are the prime basis in this work for distinguishing temporary from permanent movements in government purchases, it would be infeasible to allow unrestricted direct wartime output effects and still carry out interesting tests of the underlying hypotheses. In any event the restriction that the war variables influence output only indirectly through influences on temporary government purchases is satisfied in the present case.
Elimination of future values of the casualty rate variable from the government purchases equation (12) A test that the 1942-45 observations for output conform to the same structure as that for the other years corresponds to a value for -2 log(likelihood ratio) of 37.9, which exceeds the 5 percent critical value of' the x2 distribution with 4 degrees of freedom of' 9.5.*1 It seems likely that this appearance of structural break during World War II would not appear if the functional form were altered to allow for a nonlinear dependence of log(Yt) on (go -gl')t. Specifically, the most important change from the 1946-78 estimates in equation ( The empirical part of this study documents the positive output effect of defense purchases. There is evidence that temporary movements in defense purchases, which are associated primarily with wartime, produce roughly double the response in output as that generated by equal-sized, but permanent, shifts in defense purchases. In all cases the results are consistent with a dampened, rather than a multiplicative, response of output. The effects of nondefense purchases are imprecisely determined.
The theoretical section stresses intertemporal substitution variables as the channel for the strong positive output effect of temporary shifts in government purchases. Preliminary empirical analysis of realized real rates of return (Barro 1981a) provides some support for this mechanism, but further joint consideration of output and real-rateof-return behavior would constitute useful research. 
Expecatiotts of Future Wars
Calculation of expected future casualty rates is based on the following stationary probability model for wars.,` First, a 2 x 2 matrix is specified for the probability of' war or peace next year (or rather for year t + 3 when conditions at t + 2 are assumed known at date t), conditional on war or peace prevailing currently. It is assumed that information about the future course of' B is contained fully in the most recent observation, earlier values of B and values of' other variables not having to be considered. The probability of' war during at least part of' next year, given peace for the latest observation, is based on data over the 1774-1978 period-namely, P = Prob(Bt+, > 0 1 Bt = 0) = 9/162 = .06,
where 162 is the total number of' peacetime years in the sample (where Bt = 0), and 9 is the number of these years that were followed by the outbreak of' war.: Correspondingly, the probability of' peace continuing is given by 3' The probability P2 refers to the existence of' war during at least part of' a year following a period of' war during at least part of the previous year.
: 16 This calculation pertains to the existence of' peace over the entire year t + 1, conditional on war during at least part of year t. 
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Since war could break out at any time during the year, the annualized value of EBt+,, denoted by BA, would be roughly twice the above figure-that is 
